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Book Review
AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE: JEWS, JEWISHNESS,
AND ENGLISH LAW, by Didi Herman 1
MARTIN LOCKSHIN 2
ARE JEWS TREATED FAIRLY in today’s courts in the West? Most of us would

answer in the affirmative without a second thought. But a new, well-documented,
and provocative book by Didi Herman, Professor of Law and Social Change at
the University of Kent in England, An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness,
and English Law, raises some serious doubts about the way that Jews have been
and continue to be treated in English courts.
Herman analyzes dozens of cases involving disparate areas of law from
the twentieth century and one famous case from the twenty-first. She argues
that judges often have shown a shocking lack of sympathy when faced with
discrimination against Jews. The book takes its title from a 1998 case3 where
a Jew and a non-Jew were on trial for handling stolen goods.4 The prosecution
claimed in its summary that the Jewish defendant was
the most self-regarding, utterly cynical, greedy man, you can’t believe a word he
says… . A master of deceit… . I draw an analogy with Oliver Twist who is seen in the
musical where Fagin … goes through all the money and the lolly and the jewels … because like Fagin he is keeping his hands on his own material … he is very similar… .5

The Jewish defendant’s counsel complained that the speech was “racially
and religiously offensive” and that, accordingly, his client had been denied a fair

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 193 pages.
Professor, Department of Humanities, York University.
Herman, supra note 1 (discussing the unreported case R v Elias (15 December 1998), (CA
(UK)) [Elias]).
Herman, supra note 1 at 45-46.
Herman, ibid at 46; Elias, supra note 3.
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trial.6 Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal rejected this argument. The
fact that the jury found only the Jewish defendant guilty proved nothing, the
Court of Appeal ruled. The court held that Crown counsel’s “fusillade of insults”
did not exceed “the permissible limits of advocacy,”7 and that it was simply “an
unfortunate coincidence” that the Jewish defendant who was found guilty had
been compared to Fagin, Dickens’ Jew in Oliver Twist.8 The trial judge said that
he had thought the defendant (named Misha Chaim Baruch Elias) “might be
Jewish,” but since the point of his Jewishness had not been made at trial, no clear
case existed to prove that the jury had heard a discriminatory charge.9
Another example of indifference to discrimination against Jews comes,
less surprisingly, from a 1947 case.10 Jewish refugees from the Holocaust were
stopped by British authorities as they attempted to enter Palestine on the ship, the
President Warfield.11 The Jewish Agency retained a noted lawyer to apply for a writ
of habeas corpus, alleging that the Jewish refugees were being unlawfully detained
at sea by the British government. As many will remember, the writ was denied.12
Herman notes that the judge did not even mention the fact that the detainees
on the ship had just survived the horrors of the Holocaust, nor that most of
them were essentially stateless refugees13 (the decision simply refers to them as
“immigrants”).14 In fact, nowhere in the decision did the judge even mention that
the detainees were Jewish (although the judge did refer to the local “champions”
of these “immigrants” as “the Jews”).15 Neither did the judge consider the irony
of the fact that the British authorities were taking the ‘immigrants’ on the ship
against their will to Germany.16
A few times in the book Herman notes that in the last three or four decades,
a number of claims have been filed under the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA)
alleging discrimination against Jews.17 All of these have failed except for one
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 103-04; R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte Greenberg, [1947] 2 All
ER 550, 14 ILR 69 Ch [Greenberg].
The case is well-known; the President Warfield was renamed the Exodus by its Jewish crew.
Herman, supra note 1 at 103-104.
Ibid at 106.
Ibid; Greenberg, supra note 10 at 556.
Herman, ibid; Greenberg, ibid at 551.
Herman, ibid.
Ibid at 138-42; Race Relations Act 1976 (UK), c 74; and Race Relations Amendment Act 2000
(UK), c 34.
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famous case in 2007 (Jewish Free School (JFS); more on that case below), and the
only party ever found guilty of racial discrimination against a Jew under the RRA
was an Orthodox Jewish school!18
Herman’s argument is even stronger than this. Not only have English
courts been insensitive to discrimination against Jews, they have also tolerated
and adopted discriminatory attitudes themselves. For example, in 1922, a court
supported an insurance company’s decision not to honour a claim on the policy
of a Jewish client who had suffered a burglary.19 The court ruled that the client
had not disclosed an allegedly relevant fact on his application for insurance—he
had failed to list the name that he had been known under in Romania before
he immigrated to England. The court accepted the argument that the insurance
company might well have refused to insure the client, named Harry Horne, had
they realized that he was born under the name Euda Gedale and had lived in
Romania until age twelve.20 Court documents describe Harry/Euda as the son
of a “Hebrew teacher.”21 As the court wrote, “It is impossible to say that matters
such as nationality, caste and early domicil cannot be of importance in judging as
to the risk that underwriters run in entering into such a contract.”22
Not quite as egregious as the suggestion that a Jewish background is
reasonable grounds for denying insurance is the judicial claim that Jewish identity
is essentially so strange as to be unknowable. Courts in many countries struggle
with the question of the validity of conditions in wills stipulating that an heir will
inherit only if he or she remains or marries within the faith. Various grounds have
been used to void such conditions. Herman dedicates a whole chapter to this
issue, concentrating much of her discussion on decisions from the early 1940s.23
In one decision, an English court struggled with the validity of a will’s provision
that the beneficiaries would inherit provided that they did not “contract a
marriage with a person who is not of Jewish parentage and of the Jewish faith.”24
The House of Lords (acting then in its role as the court of last resort) supported
the trial judge, who had ruled that such language was overly vague and that no
clear meaning could be attached to the phrases “of Jewish parentage” or “of the
18. R (E) v Governing Body of JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535 (Admin), [2008] ELR 445 Ch [JFS,
Ch], rev’d (2009), [2009] EWCA Civ 626, 4 All ER 375 (CA) [JFS, CA], rev’d (2010),
[2009] UKSC 1, IRLR 136 (UKSC) [JFS, UKSC].
19. Herman, supra note 1 at 33-34; Horne v Poland, [1922] 2 KB 364, 38 TLR 357 Ch [Horne].
20. Herman, ibid at 34; Horne, ibid at 366.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Herman, ibid at 50.
24. Ibid at 54; Re Samuel, Jacobs v Ramsden, [1941] 1 All ER 539 Ch [Re Samuel].
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Jewish faith.”25 One of the Lords explained that he was sure that “the testator
meant no more than that the husband should be of Hebraic blood. But what
degree of Hebraic blood would a permissible husband have to possess? … These
are questions to which no answer has been furnished by the testator. … [T]he
condition is voided for uncertainty.”26 As Herman notes, the testator had made
no reference at all to “blood,” but the judges assumed that Jewish identity had to
be blood-based.27 Herman also notes that in these very same years English courts
had no problem enforcing a condition in a will stipulating that a beneficiary
had to be “a Protestant in religion and a whole hearted believer in the Deity of
Christ.”28 The courts felt that this language was not vague, but they felt that the
phrases “of Jewish parentage” and “of the Jewish faith” were.
Herman cites many more cases and categories of law to show that these
judicial attitudes to Jews in English courts persisted into more modern times.
Readers will come to their own conclusions about the strength of her evidence.
I was generally convinced, but felt that a small number of the arguments were
stretching the point. Nevertheless, the main thesis of the book deserves attention:
Herman’s claim that judges in the English system often used “racialist” and
“Orientalist” thinking towards Jews, and understood them through the lens of
Christianity, not in their own terms.29
Herman’s strongest argument for the persistence of this approach into the
twenty-first century is from the JFS case, which made great waves in the United
Kingdom and in Jewish communities around the world. She dedicates two full
chapters to this case.30
The rules of the Jewish Free School [the “school”] stipulated that the Office
of the Chief Rabbi (OCR) of the United Kingdom had the right to determine
who was Jewish and thus eligible for admission to the school. The claimant in
JFS was a Jewish man alleging racial discrimination against his ex-wife and son;
she was a convert to Judaism and the son was denied admission to the school.
The school argued that they had denied the son admission on religious grounds
and on the advice of the OCR, who did not feel that the child passed the test of
being Jewish since his mother’s conversion had allegedly been done in an invalid

25. Herman, ibid at 55; Re Samuel, ibid at 542-43.
26. Herman, ibid at 56; Clayton and another v Ramsden and others, [1943] 1 ALL ER 16, [1943]
AC 320 HL (Eng) at 22.
27. Herman, ibid.
28. Ibid at 57-58; Re Mylne, Potter v Dow, [1941] 1 All ER 405, 57 TLR 311 Ch.
29. Herman, ibid at 15.
30. Ibid at 126, 157.
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way.31 (The issue of validity of conversions is a source of great tension within the
contemporary Jewish community worldwide.) The trial judge ruled in favour of
the school,32 but on appeal to the new Supreme Court (which replaced the House
of Lords), the school was found guilty of racial discrimination and now has to
use a different criterion for determining the eligibility of students for admission.33
It was not really the policies of the school but rather the Jewish definition of who
is a Jew—a definition that has been in use for at least two thousand years (namely,
a person whose mother is Jewish, or who converted in a valid conversion)—that
the Court ruled to be discriminatory and racist.34 As Herman explains, this decision
makes sense only if Jewishness is racialized (i.e., if Jews are understood to be a
race).35 Only then one could argue that the claimant’s son was a victim of racial
discrimination. But if, as any serious scholar would argue, Jews are not a race, then
the school was simply applying a religious test to its potential students.
Herman shows that some of the judges of the Court failed to understand
Judaism in its own terms. Lady Hale, one of the then seven Supreme Court
justices, noted that “[t]he Christian Church will admit children regardless of
who their parents are” and assumed that Jewish schools ought to do the same.36
Herman also notes that most of the Court failed to understand the most basic
aspects of Jewish identity. For example, some of those judges alleged that the
mother of this potential student had suffered discrimination because she was
Italian and not Jewish—as if it were impossible to be both Italian and Jewish!37
As Herman concludes, “One of the ironies of the JFS decision is that as the court
calls the school a racial discriminator, the judges themselves indulge in some
of the clumsiest racial discrimination we have seen amongst the cases discussed
in this book.”38 (Herman makes it fairly clear that she is not a supporter of the
school’s old admissions policy, but she strenuously objects to the way that the
Court ruled against it.)39 In summary, Herman makes a convincing case for the
claim that Jews have often been given unfair treatment in English courts. But
why is this the case?
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Ibid at 149-50.
Ibid at 151; JFS, Ch, supra note 18.
Herman, ibid at 161-62; JFS, UKSC, supra note 18 at para 66.
Herman, ibid at 166.
Ibid at 167.
Ibid at 157, 168; JFS, UKSC, supra note 18 at para 69.
Herman, ibid at 161; JFS, UKSC, ibid at para 66.
Herman, ibid at 165.
Ibid at 162.
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Since I am a scholar of Jewish Studies, not of law, it is this last question that
intrigued me as I read the book. Herman makes it clear in the beginning of the
book that she would avoid as much as possible using the term “antisemitism” in
her analysis, apparently because she sees the term as politically charged.40 She
claims that she is following the pattern of “critical Jewish Studies” scholars who,
she says, avoid that term.41 She suggests that the type of problems that she is
identifying in English legal decisions about Jews may well apply to any minority
in England that is perceived as deviating from the accepted pattern of secular—
i.e., Christian—behaviour.42
Some people understand antisemitism as simply one manifestation of
the common antipathy to the “other.” That is certainly part of the story. For
example, the Chief Rabbi of England, Lord Jonathan Sacks, writes in a 2011
book: “Anti-Semitism, the ‘oldest hatred,’ is ultimately dislike of the unlike—the
fear mutating into hate of the stranger. … Anti-Semitism, though it begins with
Jews, never ends with Jews. It is the paradigm case of the hatred of difference.”43
But scholars of antisemitism also outline a very particular aspect of this
discrimination that has arguably been endemic to Western countries in many
different forms for the last two millennia, and which has led to the killing
of the largest number of members of any minority group in the West in the
twentieth century.
Here and there in Herman’s analysis we see hints that she has identified
a specifically anti-Jewish animus at work in English society and its judiciary.
Consider one of her points about an aspect of the Court’s JFS decision: the
assumption that no religious group can self-define even in part on the basis
of a person’s birth, as such a criterion would be, by definition, racist. Herman
astutely notes:
Pauline Christianity placed itself against a Jewish notion of ‘inherited contract,’ replacing it with a different narrative—one about consent. In JFS we
can see the same dynamics at play. The judges cut off the Jewish story, labelling
it blood-based and therefore ‘racial,’ replacing it with a Christian myth of individuality and autonomy. This is the rejection of Judaism at the heart of Christian … supersessionary … discourse. The fact that non-Jews have been welcomed into Jewishness through conversion for well over 2,000 years … does
not fit the Christian triumphalist narrative, and so the judges simply ignore it.44
Ibid at 25.
Ibid.
Ibid at 24, 26.
Koren Sacks Rosh HaShana Mahzor, translated by Jonathan Sacks (Jerusalem: Koren
Jerusalem, 2011) at 450.
44. Herman, supra note 1 at 167.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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Just as we find a troubling tendency in some right-wing circles to exaggerate
the amount of antisemitism in the West today, so too is there an equally troubling
tendency on the Left to avoid calling antisemitism by its name. While antisemitism
is not the most dangerous form of discrimination in Western countries today, it
does exist, and it is disconcerting that Herman is loath to use the word. The
evidence she presents in this book goes beyond what she writes in the opening
pages: “What I have found in the cases [discussed in this book] is not ‘hatred,’
but distaste, not ‘malice’ but unease and confusion.”45 I think she has found more
than that: the persistence of long-standing and discriminatory anti-Jewish beliefs,
some of which originated in supersessionist Christianity and have since become
secularized. These beliefs have been adopted by too many judges on the bench
in England.
In any case, Herman should be given credit for producing a fascinating book
based on wide-ranging research, which is accessible to any intelligent reader and
which provides us with food for thought.

45. Ibid at 25.

